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DRC'de 17. Ebola Salgını: Gıda Güvencesi Tehlikede

Summary · AI generated

Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'nde 15 Mayıs 2026'da, Ituri eyaletinin Djugu bölgesine bağlı Mungbwalu'da Bundibugyo türü Ebola virüsü salgını ilan edildi. Bu, 1976'dan bu yana ülkede kaydedilen 17. Ebola salgını oldu. Salgın, çatışmalardan etkilenen bölgede halk sağlığını tehdit ederken, gıda güvencesi üzerinde de ciddi riskler yaratıyor. FEWS NET analizi, salgının tarım faaliyetlerini, pazarlara erişimi ve gıda tedarik zincirlerini aksatarak gıda güvensizliğini derinleştirebileceğine işaret ediyor.

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Started 22 Jul, 15:23 1 events Updated 4d ago
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latest: 4d ago
  1. Humanitarian22 Jul, 15:23

    A closer look at the current Ebola virus epidemic and its impacts on food security outcomes

    A closer look at the current Ebola virus epidemic and its impacts on food security outcomes Source: FEWS NET using data from the National Institute of Public Health The outbreak of the Bundibugyo strain Ebola virus declared on May 15, 2026 in Mungbwalu, in the territory of Djugu (Ituri), is the 17th Ebola epidemic recorded in the DRC since the discovery of the virus in the country in 1976. The outbreak has spread to several localities, including Bunia (Ituri); Butembo, Beni, and Goma (North Kivu); Kabare (South Kivu); and certain areas of Uganda, which led the World Health Organization to declare a public health emergency of international concern on May 17. The latest estimates from June 21 report more than 1,048 confirmed cases and approximately 267 deaths, making this Ebola outbreak the fastest ever recorded during its first 100 days. Primarily concentrated in Ituri and North and South Kivu, the epidemic is placing increased pressure on an already weakened health system in these conflict-affected areas, with drug shortages, staff departures, and limited household access to essential water, sanitation, and hygiene services. In response to the epidemic, Rwanda and Uganda closed their borders to the movement of people, disrupting the activities of small cross-border traders and certain household income sources. The absence of an approved treatment or vaccine against Bundibugyo strain infection, combined with the population's distrust of health services responsible for containing the spread, further complicate the implementation of a response in a region already weakened by conflict, population displacement, and heavy dependence on cross-border trade. The proliferation of armed groups in affected areas hinders the access necessary for the response to this epidemic, similar to during the 2018-2020 epidemic caused by the Zaire strain, which also occurred in a context of conflict in Ituri and North Kivu, and caused more than 3,400 cases. In conflict-affected areas, this combination of security and health constraints risks further limiting populations' access to health services and markets, disrupting agricultural and commercial activities, and intensifying pressures on livelihoods and food security. Although the effects of the epidemic remain limited for now, it risks intensifying medium-term disruptions to markets, livelihoods, and production, worsening the already significant effects of conflict on food security. Despite the closure of borders with Rwanda and Uganda, commercial trade in the form of cargo continues to transport goods to the DRC. However, the main disruptions concern the mobility of people, which results in income losses for many households dependent on cross-border trade. Apart from the slowdown in cross-border activities, the mobility of agricultural and mining labor continues. In response to official restrictions, informal, costly, and dangerous circuits have developed in certain border areas (Figure 3). In Goma, Kasindi, Bukavu, and in certain areas of Ituri, alternative routes and informal cross-border supply circuits have developed in response to trade restrictions. However, these flows remain limited and generate additional costs related to informal payments. These mechanisms allow for partial continuity of trade and the movement of certain people and certain goods but increase transaction costs and pose significant risks for traders. At the same time, the M23 has strengthened movement restrictions on people from areas administered under government control to limit health and security risks. While the transport of goods remains authorized, transporters proceed with a driver change at Kitsombiro, in the territory of Lubero, which slows down commercial trade and increases transport and transaction costs. Markets continue to function normally, and the majority of products remain available, including imported commodities, although at increasing prices. Markets continue to function overall, with the maintenance of trade flows and the availability of local production supporting supply and limiting supply disruptions despite sanitary controls at borders. A price increase is nevertheless observed for certain staple products between May 20 (just after the declaration of the epidemic) and June 17 (FEWS NET): white maize flour by approximately 20 percent in Beni and Bukavu, reflecting disruptions and price increases in certain markets despite the relative overall stability of supply. These increases are primarily explained by rising transaction costs, delays in cross-border trade, and precautionary behaviors adopted by some traders in an uncertain context. Shortages remain minimal, however, as trade flows have not been interrupted and local supply continues to partially offset slowdowns in imports. This situation is also reflected in price decreases for certain products during the same period, notably mixed beans in Bunia (-9 percent) and vegetable oil in Goma (-14 percent), which demonstrates relative market stability and sufficient supply for several food commodities in the short term. In Mungbwalu in the territory of Djugu, the epicenter of the Ebola epidemic, mining activities continue without major disruptions, although some traders have left the area for Bunia due to fear of the disease. According to key informants, miners continue their typical activities, with mining remaining their primary source of income. The dry season, characterized by a lower risk of landslides, also favors the continuation and intensification of activities before the start of the rains in September. The maintenance of these livelihoods supports household purchasing power and their access to food. Furthermore, food supply continues to depend largely on neighboring territories, which continue to supply local markets despite the epidemic context. Together, these factors are limiting the impact of Ebola on food security in the area thus far. Farmers in provinces affected by the epidemic are currently in the S1 harvest period and continue their agricultural activities despite preventive barrier measures against the epidemic. This situation contributes to the availability of local food commodities on markets and partially explains the relative price stability observed in several. In these areas, the Ebola epidemic and response measures have no significant effect on agricultural production or on demand for agricultural labor. In contrast, conflict continues to limit access to land, reduce agricultural production, and restrict agricultural work opportunities. However, conflict-related disruptions and the reduction in cultivated areas is maintaining food supply below its typical level. Nevertheless, the availability of harvests from main counter-season crops continues to support supply and facilitate access to food. However, this stability remains fragile. If the border closures are prolonged and informal channels become more controlled or insufficient to supplement formal imports, an atypical and more pronounced increase in food commodity prices could be observed during the lean season starting in August and September. In this case, prices would remain generally above the five-year average, with atypical fluctuations compared to the previous year, characterized by a reduction in stocks and increased dependence on markets. Upward pressures on prices of imported commodities are already anticipated due to high transaction costs, risk premiums, and slowdowns in informal channels. Conflict remains the primary driver of food insecurity in these areas, while the Ebola epidemic constitutes an additional shock with effects that are expected to progressively intensify over the medium term. Following the persistent displacements caused by various conflicts, millions of households have lost their assets, which reduces their resilience and coping capacity, and increases the risk of severe food consumption deficits. Furthermore, the epidemic limits income-earning opportunities and increases marketing costs, leading to additional erosion of purchasing power for households increasingly dependent on markets, particularly as the lean season approaches. The situation is particularly critical in Ituri, where displaced households are exposed to Ebola in certain IDP camps, affecting populations most vulnerable to food security shocks. In areas already classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to conflict, poor households are expected to increasingly resort to the least expensive and least preferred foods, or even depend on solidarity from other households, while displaced persons will rely more on potential humanitarian assistance in the area. The food security of populations in this territory will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with a small proportion in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Subnational Population in Need (PIN) estimates for Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu In select instances where a more detailed understanding of the population in need is required, the DST provides ad hoc subnational PIN estimates. Table 1 Breakdown of the total PIN estimate, by IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5 with highest PIN Oct 2026 - Jan 2027 IPC PhasePercent of populationPopulation in Need (PIN) Phase 3* 77% 4.0-4.99 million Phase 4* 23% 1.0-1.49 million Phase 5 0% 0 * Given that FEWS NET produces PIN estimates in standardized ranges at both the province and territory level, the total sum of the low value and high value is not equivalent to the aggregate population in need. Table 2 North Kivu province estimated Population in Need (PIN) by territory and IPC phase Territory Institute of Statistics Population Estimate, 2025 Total Phase 3 Ranges* Total Phase 4 Ranges* Phase 5 IPC Phase 3, lower bound IPC Phase 3, upper bound IPC Phase 4, lower bound IPC Phase 4, upper bound Total 9,149, 630 1,500,000 1,999,999 500,000 749,000 0 Nyiragongo 426,735 50,000 99,999 10,000 49,999 - Lubero (inclusive of Butembo) 2,150,733 500,000 749,999 100,000 249,999 - Masisi 1,844,412 250,000 499,999 100,000 249,999 - Beni (inclusive of Beni and Oicha) 1,767,439 250,000 499,999 100,000 249,999 - Rutshuru (inclusive of Goma) 2,381,180 250,000 499,999 100,000 249,999 - Walikale 579,131 100,000 249,999 10,000 49,999 - * Given that FEWS NET produces PIN estimates in standardized ranges at both the province and territory level, the total sum of the low value and high value is not equivalent to the aggregate population in need. Table 3 South Kivu province estimated Population in Need (PIN) by territory and IPC phase Territory Institute of Statistics Population Estimate, 2025 Total Phase 3 Ranges* Total Phase 4 Ranges* Phase 5 IPC Phase 3, lower bound IPC Phase 3, upper bound IPC Phase 4, lower bound IPC Phase 4, upper bound Total 7,930,725 1,500,000 1,999,999 250,000 499,999 0 Fizi 952,850 100,000 249,999 50,000 99,999 - Idjwi 321,406 10,000 49,999 0 10,000 - Kabare 1,172,820 100,000 249,999 10,000 49,999 - Kalehe (inclusive of Bukavu) 2,037,467 250,000 499,999 50,000 99,999 - Mwenga 849,243 100,000 249,999 50,000 99,999 - Shabunda 762,705 100,000 249,999 50,000 99,999 - Uvira 971,441 100,000 249,999 50,000 99,999 - Walungu 862,793 100,000 249,999 50,000 99,999 - * Given that FEWS NET produces PIN estimates in standardized ranges at both the province and territory level, the total sum of the low value and high value is not equivalent to the aggregate population in need. Table 4 Ituri province estimated Population in Need (PIN) by territory and IPC phase Territory Institute of Statistics Population Estimate, 2025 Total Phase 3 Ranges* Total Phase 4 Ranges* Phase 5 IPC Phase 3, lower bound IPC Phase 3, upper bound IPC Phase 4, lower bound IPC Phase 4, upper bound Total 4,841,791 1,000,000 1,499,999 250,000 499,999 0 Aru 865,880 100,000 249,999 0 10,000 - Djugu 1,570,726 250,000 499,999 100,000 249,999 - Irumu (inclusive of Bunia) 870,147 100,000 249,999 10,000 49,999 - Mahagi 1,209,650 250,000 499,999 50,000 99,999 - Mabasa 325,388 50,000 99,999 10,000 49,999 - * Given that FEWS NET produces PIN estimates in standardized ranges at both the province and territory level, the total sum of the low value and high value is not equivalent to the aggregate population in need. tfinstuen@fews.net Wed, 07/22/2026 - 15:23 Download the report 652

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