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Can the world benefit from China’s quest for food security?

Can the world benefit from China’s quest for food security? Expert comment jon.wallace 22 July 2026 China wants to become more self-sufficient in food. This could make it easier to fight climate change and improve nutrition worldwide, but there are also risks to global food markets. China’s remarkable economic transformation over the past four decades has sharply reduced the share of its population who are hungry – from 30 per cent in 1980 to less than 2.5 per cent today. In part that has been achieved by ensuring it has the means to buy the food and food inputs it cannot make for itself. Today China is the world’s largest agricultural importer, accounting for 60 per cent of soybean imports and 76 per cent of beef imports in 2024. China’s drive for food security Food security is seen as central to maintaining the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. But China has become increasingly concerned over whether the food and food inputs it imports will continue to be available and at an acceptable price. The threat of weather-linked shortages among a fairly concentrated group of major suppliers is a long-standing concern which is being made worse by climate change. And growing tensions with the US have heightened China’s concerns over threats to its overseas supply sources and transport routes. China’s first response has been to diversify its sources of supply, and in particular to reduce its reliance on the US. Brazil replaced the US as China’s largest foreign agricultural supplier in 2018, exporting nearly $60 billion of agricultural products (mainly soybeans and beef) to China in 2023. China’s ability to become self-sufficient in food is limited by its acute shortage of arable land and water scarcity Chinese firms are building port and rail infrastructure to help develop new suppliers, reduce costs and avoid chokepoints: a new port at Chancay in Peru and rail link to Brazil will reduce reliance on the Panama Canal. China also holds very large buffer stocks and accounts for more than 60 per cent of global stocks of maize and close to 50 per cent of such stocks of wheat. These efforts have been complemented by an increasing determination to become more self-sufficient in food production. The Chinese approach relies on the development and deployment of new technologies, applying regulation and subsidies, and coordinating state and private sector firms. Major improvements in Chinese agricultural infrastructure have already been achieved, reducing waste and conserving water. Parallels with manufacturing Some experts have argued that China’s emerging food strategy parallels the approach it previously deployed to become a world leader in advanced manufacturing – particularly of green tech products – substituting for imports and sharply increasing exports. There are aspects of the food security strategy that parallel what has happened in the manufacturing sector. But there are also important differences: the food strategy faces additional constraints that are not present in manufacturing. And the strategy has other objectives alongside greater self-sufficiency, including maintaining affordability and improving resilience, sustainability and population health. China’s ability to become self-sufficient in food is limited by its acute shortage of arable land and water scarcity, made worse by urban development and industrial contamination. Applying investment and technology to improve food processing efficiency may be straightforward. But using technology to improve agricultural yields is much harder. So too is developing alternative sources of protein attractive to Chinese consumers. Related work ‘Structural divergence’ in China’s economy exposes a growing problem There are also risks involved with concentrating food production within China’s borders. Doing so could increase the vulnerability of the food supply to climate shocks. It could also raise the scale and intensity of farming – risking increased pollution, water scarcity, land degradation and energy demand. Reducing dependence on foreign supplies of animal feeds and increasing the use of new protein sources is also likely to increase domestic food prices, at least in the short term. And the effects on foreign relations could be significant: reducing imports could weaken the political influence China has over food exporting countries, while increasing food exports – on top of the existing manufacturing surplus – would exacerbate trade tensions. Lastly, there is the problem of ‘involution’: Chinese state interventions in manufacturing have contributed to excessive competition. The same issue could affect agriculture: deploying subsidies to improve efficiency and reduce costs through innovation and investment may conflict with the goal of maintaining farmer incomes. Global impacts Overall, however, it does seem likely that China’s food security strategy, combined with its declining population, will eventually lead to a sustained decline in average agricultural imports and a more diversified supply base. Moreover, there should be a reasonable amount of time for China’s major food suppliers to adjust. A number of possible benefits for the world may follow. Most importantly, the reduction in overall Chinese demand for food imports could reduce deforestation in supplier countries. Land freed up from supplying China may be redeployed into supplying food to other markets with rapidly expanding populations such as sub-Saharan Africa, or in the production of future biofuels which could yet play a significant role in decarbonizing transport. It may also create additional production capacity and space for nature-based means of carbon sequestration, facilitating the changes in land use necessary to deliver net zero. And China’s increased sustainability standards at home may spill over into its purchases of food from abroad. Meanwhile the enhanced technologies developed to enhance Chinese self-sufficiency may potentially be applied elsewhere. That could help improve yields, resist contamination, reduce waste, recover degraded land and create new nutritional products. China’s efforts to diversify its sources of supply could also accelerate modernization of agriculture in non-traditional markets, improving local food supply alongside economic growth. But there are also significant risks which need to be managed. Development of non-traditional markets could increase deforestation pressures if not effectively regulated. Redeployment of land to biofuels could reduce the global food system’s ability to respond to climate or other supply shocks. Lower Chinese external demand for food in ‘normal’ times could be accompanied by heightened risk of sudden spillovers – positive or negative – to international markets. A sudden increase in heavily subsidized Chinese exports would be highly damaging to farmers in developing countries. The case for international cooperation What the rest of the world needs from China is the greatest possible stability and predictability in its net external demand for food over time. China is not the only source of potential shocks to the global food system – the rapid take up of weight loss drugs in advanced countries is another potentially transformative factor. But the sheer scale of Chinese demand makes it a special case. The world also needs major food producers to maintain the ability to respond flexibly to supply shocks. And it needs China to use its market power to encourage rising sustainability standards worldwide. China also stands to benefit from such an outcome, and strengthened cooperation between producers and consumers is the most likely route to achieving it. Some steps are already being taken, such as a dialogue underway in the WTO on setting common sustainability standards for trade in food. But these need stronger political backing, greater urgency and the areas of cooperation need to be broadened. Low income developing countries need reasonable access to new food-related technologies being developed by China and the advanced economies, including those that deploy AI. Greater transparency is needed over demand and supply, particularly with respect to the future role of biofuel production. As food stocks may play an increasingly critical role in balancing shocks, more transparency is needed on their level and how they will be used, including in a crisis. Increased geopolitical tension is driving China’s food security strategy, but international cooperation can turn this into a ‘win-win’ outcome for both China and the wider world. Neither side should miss the opportunity.