Çoklu Şoklar La Guajira ve Chocó'da Gıda Krizini 2027'ye Kadar Uzatıyor
Kolombiya'nın La Guajira ve Chocó bölgelerinde, hava koşullarına bağlı şoklar, yerel güvensizlik ve enflasyonun üzerinde seyreden gıda fiyatları nedeniyle IPC 3. Aşama (Kriz) gıda güvensizliği koşullarının en az Ocak 2027'ye kadar sürmesi bekleniyor. FEWS NET'in analizine göre, La Guajira'da tekrarlayan kuraklık tarımsal üretimi ve gelirleri azaltırken, her iki bölgede de yükselen fiyatlar hanelerin temel gıda maddelerine erişimini kısıtlıyor. Bu kriz seviyesindeki gıda güvensizliği, bölge sakinlerinin geçim kaynaklarını ve beslenme durumunu tehdit etmeye devam edecek. Yerel güvensizlik ve iklim şoklarının birleşimi, acil insani yardım ihtiyacını artırırken, uzun vadeli dayanıklılık için iklim adaptasyonu ve çatışma çözümüne yönelik müdahalelerin önemini vurguluyor.
This summary is currently in Turkish; automated English translation is coming soon.
Bağlam, hikayenin etrafındaki ülke + lider + komşu hikaye ağına dayanılarak AI tarafından üretildi. Olgu içerikleri için her zaman üstteki kaynak linklerine başvurun.
Bu gündemi takip et
Kolombiya gelişmelerini kaçırma — ücretsiz kaydol, günlük brifinginde gör.
Timeline
latest: 09 Jul- Humanitarian07 Jul, 15:12
Multiple shocks drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in La Guajira and Chocó
Multiple shocks drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in La Guajira and Chocó Key Messages Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027 in La Guajira and Chocó, where a combination of weather-related shocks, localized insecurity, and prices rising above general inflation are reducing own production and income. In La Guajira, where recurrent drought has reduced households’ capacity to cope, below-average rainfall and negative soil moisture anomalies are expected to worsen as El Niño develops, negatively impacting livestock and crop production and reducing water availability. In Chocó, river transportation and crop production are negatively impacted by above-average rainfall earlier this year, persistent risk of flooding, and localized insecurity, resulting in intermittent confinement and low levels of displacement that are likely to continue limiting access to markets and livelihoods, particularly for poor Indigenous and Afro-Colombian households in remote riverine areas. Across the rest of Colombia, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to remain widespread, with several departments maintaining Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. Above-average prices for agricultural inputs, utilities, some food items, and other non-food essentials will constrain poor households’ purchasing power and result in the use of sustainable coping strategies among poor households to maintain minimally adequate food consumption. In remote, border, and conflict-affected areas, higher transportation costs and localized insecurity are expected to cause temporary market disruptions and further raise prices. The population in need of humanitarian food assistance is expected to rise gradually during the projection period, reaching between 4.0-4.99 million people as the negative impacts of El Niño increasingly affect livelihoods. In localized areas, an increase in conflict events is also expected to reduce access to food, especially during periods of confinement or displacement. Poor rural (including Indigenous and Afro-Colombian), peri-urban, Venezuelan migrant, and urban households reliant on informal labor remain populations of highest concern. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 25, 2026. Food security context Colombia is a highly urbanized, upper-middle-income country. Approximately 77 percent of the population resides in urban areas. Despite recent declines in monetary poverty, significant structural inequalities persist, reflected in a pronounced urban-rural divide and high levels of informal labor. Poverty and food insecurity are concentrated in rural and peripheral regions, where institutions are relatively weaker, market connectivity is constrained, and exposure to conflict is high, while poor urban populations also face financial food access constraints. Informal employment dominates livelihood strategies among both urban and rural poor households. Although the legal minimum wage is adjusted annually, many casual workers receive irregular, below-minimum wages, increasing vulnerability to shocks. Agriculture varies by region and ranges from dispersed agroforestry systems to intensive plantations to family farms. The sector employs more than half of rural workers and most rural livelihoods are tied to small-scale agriculture, wage labor, livestock rearing, fishing, and, in conflict-affected areas, coca cultivation. Production cycles and labor demand are driven by rainfall patterns and vary by region, with bimodal production systems in the Andina Region and unimodal systems elsewhere. In bimodal areas, main harvests generally occur from January to April and August to November, while unimodal areas follow different harvest calendars linked to the timing of the main rainy season. Urban livelihoods are dominated by services, trade, and manufacturing, though informal employment remains widespread, particularly among Venezuelan migrants. While remittances provide additional income for some households, they are concentrated among middle- and better-off wealth groups. The government’s social safety net system — including programs such as Renta Ciudadana, VAT refunds, Colombia Mayor, and Renta Joven — provides essential income support to populations; however, coverage gaps and irregular payment cycles reduce their ability to fully offset living costs. National food availability is generally sufficient, supported by domestic production and imports. The typical diet is based on rice, plantains/bananas, tubers, animal protein, panela, and flour, maize, or cassava arepas. Market integration is constrained by large distances, rugged terrain, and investment levels, with transportation infrastructure concentrated in central regions and limited in peripheral regions such as Pacífico, Amazonía, and Orinoquía. As a result, food prices are higher and more volatile in remote areas, while major urban centers such as Bogotá and Medellín benefit from more stable supply chains and competitive prices. Inflation has declined from peak post-pandemic levels, but both headline and food inflation remain substantially above pre-2020 levels. Armed conflict in Colombia, characterized by violence, kidnappings, and extortion, disproportionately affects rural, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities and disrupts access to food and income. In 2016, a peace agreement was signed between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but armed conflict levels have rebounded since 2023. Incomplete implementation of the peace agreement, the security vacuum created by FARC’s demobilization, and lucrative smuggling networks have enabled the fragmentation of Organized Armed Group (OAGs) focused on the control of illicit economies. Since 2022, the government has held talks known as Paz Total with multiple OAGs. Formal talks between the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN), splinter groups of the former FARC (known as the Estado Mayor Central or EMC and Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes or EMBF), Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), and the Clan del Golfo (CDG), temporarily reduced clashes with Colombian security forces. However, fighting has increased between OAGs as they compete for territorial control in rural areas, disputing lucrative production areas, drug trafficking routes, mining resources, and other illicit activities. This regularly leads to clashes that cause localized displacement, confinement, and disruption of livelihoods affecting tens of thousands, particularly along the Pacífico coast (Nariño and Chocó), Catatumbo along the Venezuelan border, southern Bolívar, and parts of the Amazon Basin. Colombia hosts the largest Venezuelan population (currently approximately 2.8 million migrants and refugees) outside of Venezuela. Most Venezuelans have obtained or are pursuing regularized status under the Temporary Protection Statute (TPS), allowing them to work legally for 10 years and making them eligible for social safety net programs. However, many migrant households, particularly those headed by women, are highly dependent on irregular, informal income, earning less than the minimum wage. Migrants are concentrated in urban centers such as Bogotá, Medellín, and Cúcuta, where they face strong competition for employment and services. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Special Report: Colombia Context Report Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Prices for most consumer goods remained elevated in May, although staple food price trends were mixed. Headline inflation, as measured by the national Consumer Price Index (CPI), rose 5.84 percent year-on-year in May, with the food and non-alcoholic beverages and transportation categories increasing by 6.04 and 5.67 percent, respectively. The Banco de la República also identified recent food price pressures associated with a stronger-than-expected increase in the prices of perishable foods, driven by temporary road blockages in April; higher international prices for fertilizers, cereals, and oils; and lagging impacts of flooding earlier in the year on beef prices. Several selected wholesale food prices increased much faster than headline and food CPI year-on-year, suggesting that price pressures for specific staples, such as tubers, may be more severe than aggregate CPI trends imply. Source: FEWS NET with data from DANE-SIPSA In the Bogotá, D.C., Corabastos reference market, criolla potato prices increased 108 percent compared to May 2025 and 60 percent above the five-year average for May. The National Administrative Department of Statistics-Information System on Prices and Supply of the Agriculture Sector (DANE-SIPSA) also reported that criolla potato prices increased for the fifth consecutive month, rising in 38 of 43 monitored markets. Cassava prices declined from April in several markets but remained elevated compared to last year, including in Bogotá, where prices were still 84 percent above May 2025 and 46 percent above the five-year average for May. Chicken prices were mixed across reference markets but remained above the five-year average in several cities, including Bogotá. In contrast, rice prices declined or remained stable in key reference markets, and maize meal and pasta prices also remained broadly stable, due to steady supply and positive exchange rate dynamics. These divergent trends reflect commodity-specific supply dynamics, with tubers more exposed to localized disruptions, cereals supported by adequate supply and imports, and animal protein prices shaped by feed, logistics, and lagged flood impacts. Agricultural input price spikes persisted in May, although market supply was largely undisrupted. DANE-SIPSAreported that 46.9 percent of monitored fertilizer, amendment, and soil-conditioner prices increased from April. The average May 2026 prices for urea were 47 percent higher than last year and around 28 percent above the five-year average, while DAP prices were around 18 percent above last year and around 21 percent above the five-year average. These increases are consistent with elevated and volatile international fertilizer prices and Colombia’s reliance on imported inputs rather than domestic supply disruptions. Weather anomalies are regionally variable as El Niño conditions begin to emerge. Rainfall between May and June has been spatially mixed, with recent rainfall deficits observed in northern and eastern Colombia, including northern Caribe areas and La Guajira, and above-average rainfall persisting in western, southern, and selected riverine areas. Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (IDEAM) reported that some areas of the Caribe, Andina, and Pacífico regions received only between 0 and 40 percent of typical rainfall. In La Guajira department, recent rainfall deficits are also consistent with June soil moisture monitoring showing dry to very dry soil conditions across much of the department. Vegetation conditions remained generally adequate to favorable nationally, although below-average values are prevalent in localized parts of northern Colombia. National weather monitoring also reported above-average temperatures, with anomalies above 2 degrees Celsius in parts of La Guajira, Magdalena, and Cesar. In areas that experienced above-average rainfall and localized flooding earlier in 2026, including parts of Córdoba department and low-lying areas such as the floodplain known as La Mojana, rainfall has since decreased substantially, reducing oversaturation of soils without negatively impacting vegetation conditions. Meanwhile, soil moisture conditions were reported to be above average in parts of Chocó and the Pacífico Region. River levels also remained elevated in several systems, including the San Jorge, Atrato, Meta, Guaviare, and Orinoco rivers. Illicit economy dynamics and clashes between OAGs vying for territorial control, as well as between OAGs and state security forces, continue to negatively affect rural households in localized areas. Currently, hundreds of Colombians – particularly Indigenous and Afro-Colombian households – are experiencing confinement, displacement, or movement restrictions that limit access to basic goods and services due to armed group control or other intimidation tactics. However, these events are considered low intensity, as they are generally not sustained over long periods of time and their impacts are typically limited in geographic scope and population affected. In June, events were reported in Chocó, La Guajira and Magdalena, Norte de Santander, Guaviare, Antioquia, Caquetá, and Nariño, while additional departments, such as Cauca, have also seen waves of violence in recent months. Conflict persisted despite a temporary ceasefire involving the ELN and EMC to facilitate voting in the June 21 presidential elections, especially as OAGs engage in actions intended to demonstrate their operational capabilities, increase their visibility, and exert greater pressure on the incoming government. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian food assistance in Colombia remains limited in scale and geographically targeted. Available reporting does not indicate coverage at levels that would alter area-level food security outcomes. Food Security and Nutrition Cluster partners reported reaching roughly 135,000 beneficiaries across 16 departments between January and May 2026 through all food security and nutrition activities, concentrated in municipalities of the Caribe, Pacífico, Andina, and Amazonía regions. However, while this broader sector reporting includes humanitarian food assistance, it also includes agricultural livelihoods and nutrition activities; detailed information on humanitarian food assistance modalities, ration sizes, beneficiary numbers, and locations is not publicly available. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in La Guajira. Structural challenges, such as low annual rainfall and limited own production capacity, limited access to water and basic services, high levels of poverty and dependence on market purchases, and limited and highly irregular income increase poor households’ vulnerability to price, weather, and labor shocks. Frequent drought episodes have resulted in reductions in herd sizes, crop losses, and below-average harvests, eroding livelihoods and households’ ability to cope. This year’s weather-related hazards are further straining resources, with negative rainfall and soil moisture anomalies deepening in June across La Guajira, combining with above-average temperatures to drive moisture stress. Prices for agricultural inputs remain elevated and unaffordable for most subsistence farmers. As a result, agricultural labor opportunities for the main season are limited, as is planted area for households’ own production of maize and beans, and the regeneration of pasture conditions and seasonal improvements in livestock body conditions. Per capita income among very poor households in La Guajira is one of the lowest in the country, and the further reduction of income, amid above-average prices and limited coping capacity, is leaving affected households struggling to maintain adequate diet quantity and quality. Worst-off households, namely poor Wayuu (the largest indigenous group in Colombia, concentrated almost entirely in La Guajira) and agropastoral households, are likely facing small to moderate food consumption gaps as they reduce the number of meals per day or reduce portions for adults so that children can eat, or are only able to meet minimum food needs through negative coping strategies, such as reducing essential non-food spending or selling remaining productive assets. In Chocó, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are driven by a combination of acute weather, conflict, and economic shocks exacerbating structural constraints tied to its remoteness. Poor households – particularly Afro-Colombian and Indigenous households – are highly vulnerable to new pressures amid high poverty levels, sparse income-earning activities, and persistently above-average transportation costs due to longstanding dependence on variable river transport. Although Chocó borders more market-integrated areas to the east, the Cordillera Occidental and limited internal road connectivity restrict the extent to which nearby supply networks translate into improved food access within the department. Following above-average rainfall throughout early 2026, soils remain oversaturated, causing high levels of runoff and persistent flood risk. Localized insecurity and extortion related to OAGs fighting for control of territory are worsening mobility limitations, particularly in the Baudó subregion, where incidents of confinement and displacement were reported in June. These combined factors are limiting access to markets, transportation, services, and livelihood activities in affected communities and reducing agricultural and economic activity and associated incomes. After years of repeated shocks, many poor households have reduced capacity to cope and are likely to be experiencing small to moderate food consumption gaps by reducing portions and number of meals per day or engaging in negative coping such as reducing spending on health and education. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing in Amazonía and Orinoquía regions, with remote and border-area departments experiencing relatively higher rates of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes at the household level. In Amazonas, Guainía, Vaupés, Vichada, Guaviare, Caquetá, and Putumayo, a combination of chronic vulnerability to shocks tied to limited income-earning opportunities and high transport costs (especially for communities dependent on river or air transportation routes) and acute stress amid above-average prices, reduced labor demand, and localized conflict continues to limit food access for poor households. While most poor households can meet their minimum food needs, they are likely doing so by reducing diet quality, spending limited savings, or incurring debt, with worst-affected households engaging in more severe strategies. In Arauca, the interaction of irregular cross-border trade and labor flows and OAG control along the Venezuela border, combined with remoteness, irregular income, and localized insecurity is driving food consumption gaps for some poor households. Across the Caribe, Pacífico, and Andina regions and more connected urban areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are prevalent, with pockets of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). For most poor households, elevated food costs relative to their often irregular and informal income (which lags behind national minimum wage adjustments) are limiting purchasing power and forcing adjustments to food consumption and livelihoods to cope. In most urban, productive, and market-integrated areas, generally well-supplied markets, diversified income sources, and better connectivity support access to minimum food needs. However, very poor households and Venezuelan migrant households remain populations of concern. Despite regularization of their immigration status, migrant incomes are well below those of Colombian households and likely remain insufficient to cover their food needs. In the Caribe Region outside La Guajira, pockets of households, mainly those affected by earlier flooding in low-lying areas such as La Mojana and parts of Córdoba, continue to face constrained livelihoods and recovery challenges, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In the Pacífico Region outside Chocó and in the Andina Region, conflict and illicit-economy dynamics remain important drivers of localized Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Insecurity and extortion continue to negatively affect livelihoods and market access in parts of Cauca and Nariño in Pacífico Region and parts of Norte de Santander (especially Catatumbo), Antioquia (especially Bajo Cauca and Urabá), and Huila in the Andina Region. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Rainfall performance is expected to remain spatially mixed through August before gradually decreasing to below-average levels in the last quarter of 2026 (Figure 2). Rainfall is expected to remain below average across most northern areas, including La Guajira, while localized areas of the Pacífico and Caribe regions are likely to shift to near-average rainfall by September. Above-average temperatures are expected throughout the outlook period, gradually increasing negative soil moisture anomalies and the risk of crop pests and diseases. Despite below-average rainfall forecasts, the risk of localized flash floods, landslides, rising rivers, and temporary road or market disruptions in areas receiving heavy rainfall over a few days persists. Source: NOAA Climate Prediction Center Weather forecasts are also likely to result in below-average yields for non-irrigated crops, negative impacts to pasture regeneration, and below-average agricultural labor demand in affected areas. In bimodal areas of the Andina Region, localized planting delays are expected for the second crop cycle. In Orinoquía and La Guajira, below-average soil moisture, above-average temperatures, and elevated wildfire risk are expected to limit pasture regeneration. Localized below-average pasture conditions and water availability are likely during the rainy season, with more widespread deterioration likely by December and January. This will likely constrain livestock body conditions, milk availability, and livestock-related income among poor agropastoral households, particularly in La Guajira and localized pastoral areas of Vichada, Arauca, Casanare, and Meta. Domestic rice and maize production is likely to be slightly below 2025 levels due to lower planted area and above-average input prices and production costs; however, imports are expected to remain above 2025 levels, cover supply gaps, and prevent a broad cereal availability shock, leaving markets generally well supplied throughout the outlook period. Despite the anticipated continuation of broadly stable national prices for key staples such as rice, maize meal, and pasta, transportation, fertilizer, utility, and other essential costs are expected to remain above average, while general inflation is expected to continue limiting real purchasing power despite moderating from recent peak levels. Market conditions are expected to remain more variable in remote, border, and conflict-affected areas than suggested by national average price trends. In Chocó department, Amazonía, and Orinoquía regions and some border departments (including Norte de Santander, Arauca, La Guajira, Putumayo, and Nariño), conflict-related access constraints and dependence on variable river or air supply routes will continue to raise the effective cost of market purchases. Violent confrontations between OAGs and between OAGs and the government are expected to intensify in selected conflict-affected areas. Throughout the outlook period, as the government transition proceeds, there is a heightened risk of terrorist attacks, armed strikes, and attacks against security forces and critical infrastructure as OAGs continue to demonstrate operational capacity, maintain leverage, or shape their position with the incoming administration. Intensified pressure on OAG structures and stronger enforcement against illicit economies are also likely to provoke additional violence, displacement, and confinement, temporarily constraining access to markets, fishing and agricultural activities, services, and income-generating opportunities in affected communities. The areas where impacts to food access are of greatest concern include central and southern Chocó, where ELN, CDG, and FARC dissident factions compete along the Baudó, San Juan, and Atrato river corridors; the Putumayo-Caquetá-Guaviare borderlands, where FARC dissident factions compete over coca, river mobility, extortion, and cross-border trafficking networks; the Sierra Nevada and the Magdalena-La Guajira coastal corridor, where ACSN and CDG compete for access to Santa Marta, Riohacha, Ciénaga, Maicao, Uribia, and maritime trafficking routes; and southern Bolívar and the San Lucas mountains, where OAGs dispute illegal mining areas and mobility routes. Income from informal agricultural and non-agricultural labor and self-employment is expected to remain irregular and often below the national minimum wage, with Venezuelan migrant households most likely to earn the lowest wage rates. In conflict-affected, remote, and weather shock-affected areas of the country, labor demand and income are expected to remain irregular and below average throughout the outlook period. Humanitarian food assistance Detailed monthly humanitarian food assistance plans and ration sizes for the outlook period are not currently available. However, targeted assistance is expected to continue similar to current levels and remain below the thresholds necessary to change the classification at the area level. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 From June to September 2026, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to remain widespread across most of Colombia, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) expected to persist in La Guajira and Chocó. Across the country, most households will be able to cover their minimum food needs with the use of sustainable coping strategies, although pockets of households worst affected by weather, price, and conflict shocks are likely to be meeting their needs only through the use of negative coping strategies. Food security conditions are expected to remain relatively stable in most areas. Food markets will remain generally well supplied through domestic production and imports, with trade flows along major corridors anticipated to continue at typical levels. The regulation of fuel and diesel prices is expected to contain upward price pressure for transportation, and annual inflation adjustments to minimum wage for those employed in the formal sector are expected to sustain access to food, while more gradual adjustments to informal wages over the course of the year are expected to be sector- and location-specific and only partially ease pressure on household budgets. Government social protection programs are likely to continue providing some income support to targeted households. Nonetheless, coverage gaps, irregular payment cycles, and targeting limitations are expected to limit a full offset of elevated living costs among the poorest households, particularly in remote rural areas and informal urban settlements. For migrant and poor urban and rural households reliant on irregular incomes in the informal sector, above-average prices for many non-staple foods, agricultural inputs, utilities, and other essential non-food items will continually erode purchasing power. Localized conflict events are expected to intensify, resulting in periodic mobility restrictions and disruptions to transportation that could constrain access to both markets and income-earning opportunities, especially in border areas and in the Pacífico and Amazonía regions. In La Guajira and Chocó, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through September. In La Guajira, outcomes are driven by atypical reductions in income due to rainfall deficits, dry soil conditions, above-average temperatures, and reduced pasture regeneration, water availability, livestock productivity, milk availability, and livestock-related income. In Chocó, low labor demand and localized insecurity, including recurring armed strikes, clashes, and mobility restrictions, are expected to continue limiting access to markets, fishing, agricultural activities, and income-earning opportunities and disrupting river transportation and local supply routes, particularly in isolated communities. In both departments, these disruptions are expected to aggravate already limited food and income access, and result in small-to-moderate food consumption gaps or the use of unsustainable coping strategies among the worst-off households. Although global acute malnutrition data are not currently available, 2026 surveillance data, which capture the prevalence of acute malnutrition through cases detected at health services, suggest that acute malnutrition risks among children under five remain above national levels in both departments but similar to previous years. From October 2026 to January 2027, widespread Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to persist, while the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to increase modestly and the population facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) is likely to increase more broadly. This deterioration will be driven by the cumulative effects of below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures, pressure on water and pasture availability in applicable areas, and localized crop and labor disruptions (especially in bimodal Andina areas, where localized planting delays and below-average second-cycle performance are expected for small producers). In addition, prices for many food and other essential items are likely to track higher than general inflation, and intermittent access constraints are expected in remote and conflict-affected areas. Temporary improvements are likely for some households around the Christmas holidays as informal labor opportunities and remittances seasonally increase. However, food access is expected to gradually worsen over the outlook period, forcing poor households to reduce diet quality and diversity, substitute toward cheaper foods, buy food on credit, increase debt, and reduce essential non-food expenditures to maintain minimum food consumption. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in departments with larger, poorer rural, peri-urban, and informal urban areas where high food and living costs, irregular income, and localized access constraints continue to limit purchasing power. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes will likely be maintained in more connected and economically diversified areas, including major urban centers and parts of the Andina Region. The sharpest increases in the population in need are expected to remain geographically concentrated in areas worst affected by weather and conflict-related shocks. In Chocó and La Guajira, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes remain most likely. In Chocó, persistent flood risk, below-average rainfall forecasts, prices well above the national average, and more pronounced conflict dynamics are expected to limit income-generating opportunities and access to food. In La Guajira, households will struggle to cope with worsening dry and warm conditions, which will further constrain water access, pasture availability, livestock body conditions, milk availability, and agropastoral income. Poor rural and Indigenous households with limited income sources and high market dependence will be most affected. In parts of Orinoquía, especially Vichada and localized pastoral areas of Arauca, Casanare, and Meta, forecasted weather is expected to reduce pasture regeneration and increase wildfire risk, with negative implications for livestock productivity and livestock-related income. These impacts are expected to become more visible toward the end of the outlook period once the rainy season ends. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Household food security outcomes and convergence analysis2025 Joint Acute Food Security Assessment; FAO DIEM Round 7Quantitative/QualitativeHousehold-level food consumption, dietary diversity, food-based and livelihoods coping, shocks, and income constraints to assess current food insecurity and trends Socioeconomic vulnerability and population contextDANE FIES 2025; DANE ECV; DANE demographic and population projections; DANE GEIH; DANE monetary poverty statisticsQuantitativeAnalysis of chronic food access context, population denominators, poverty, urbanization, labor conditions, and structural vulnerability affecting area-level analysis Markets, prices, supply, and macroeconomic conditionsDANE-SIPSA; DANE-SIPSA_A; DANE-SIPSA_I; DANE CPI; Banco de la República; CREGQuantitative/QualitativeAnalysis of staple food prices, food supply, agricultural input costs, inflation, exchange rate, fuel costs, imports, and impacts to household purchasing power Agroclimatology and seasonal forecast informationNOAA, NASA, USGS, Climate Hazards Center (UCSB); IDEAMQuantitative/QualitativeCurrent and forecasted rainfall, temperature, soil moisture, vegetation, and pasture conditions and impacts on crops, livestock, water access, and transportation logistics Conflict, access, displacement, and disaster monitoringACLED; OCHA; INDEPAZ; Defensoría del Pueblo; Policía Nacional, Ministerio de Defensa, UNGRD; local monitoring sourcesQuantitative/QualitativeConflict events, displacement, confinement, mobility restrictions, weather-related disasters, and impacts on livelihoods, markets, and humanitarian access Nutrition and mortality surveillanceINS/SivigilaQuantitativeAcute malnutrition and mortality surveillance signals Humanitarian food assistance, needs, and response monitoringHNRP 2026; Food Security and Nutrition Cluster; OCHA FTSQuantitative/QualitativePlanned and delivered assistance levels Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Source: FEWS NET Source: FEWS NET lalmonacid@fews.net Tue, 07/07/2026 - 15:12 Download the report 5
- Humanitarian09 Jul, 00:14
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) anticipated in the south through January driven by weather shocks
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) anticipated in the south through January driven by weather shocks Key Messages Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in parts of southern Malawi (the area of highest concern) and localized areas of the central region from October 2026 through January 2027, a marked deterioration following widespread Minimal (IPC Phase 1) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through September. These outcomes will likely be driven by the early depletion of household food stocks following below-average 2026 harvests and reduced purchasing power. Above-average food prices, combined with atypically low agricultural labor opportunities, are expected to constrain poor households’ ability to access food through market purchases, leading to food consumption gaps. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected across the remaining southern districts and several central region districts over the same period, as households are likely to meet minimum food needs but cannot afford some non-food expenditures without engaging in negative coping strategies. Below-average rainfall is likely in southern Malawi during the 2026/27 season, with October to January rains delayed and poorly distributed. Households’ purchasing power is expected to decline due to below-average agricultural labor income. These conditions are associated with the forecasted strengthening El Niño, which was present as of June and is likely to intensify into a very strong event. In contrast, central and northern Malawi are likely to receive near-average to above-average rainfall with planting starting in early November, supporting favorable cropping conditions. The main harvest has been completed across the country, with average yields reported at the national level, thanks to favorable rainfall conditions. However, the southern region of Malawi, including the Southern Lakeshore, Middle Shire, and Lower Shire Livelihood Zones, experienced below-average harvests due to dry spells and flooding during the main rainy season. FEWS NET estimates that 1.5-1.99 million people will require humanitarian food assistance during the October- January lean season. This represents a decline compared to the same period last year, reflecting improved national maize production and lower staple food prices. While plans for humanitarian assistance have not yet been finalized, past trends indicate that assistance is typically provided from November through at least January, coinciding with the peak of the lean season. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 26, 2026. Food security context Agriculture is central to Malawi’s economy, supporting the livelihoods of over 80 percent of the population and providing employment and income for most of the workforce. While small-scale and subsistence farming dominate the crop production sector, commercial cash crop farming makes a significant contribution. The main crops cultivated include maize (the staple food), as well as tobacco, tea, and sugarcane (the main cash crops). The northern and central regions are known for surplus production, helping to offset the deficits in the south, where small landholdings, poor soil fertility, recurrent weather shocks, and semi-arid conditions limit production. The rainy season (October-March) influences crop production activities, pasture availability, and availability of agricultural labor opportunities, leading up to and during the main maize harvest (typically April-August). The start of the main harvest coincides with the end of the typical lean season and the start of the consumption year, key timing given the importance of crop production and income sources for poor and rural households. In February (before the lean season ends), agricultural activities such as weeding typically provide increased employment opportunities. Agricultural activities on irrigated farms also typically enhance labor demand beyond the main harvest season (through November). Irrigated winter crop production supplements the main harvest, providing households with additional food, income sources, and stabilized prices due to increased food supply in local markets. Winter planting typically occurs between April and August in lowland areas that benefit from the residual moisture or access to irrigation facilities, with the winter harvest typically expected from September to November. Tobacco plays a crucial role in Malawi’s economy, serving as a source of hard currency, strengthening the country's foreign exchange reserves, and supporting overall economic stability. Tobacco production is highly labor intensive, involving planting, tending, harvesting, curing, processing, and auctioning, and provides widespread employment opportunities and household income, particularly for the poor. The tobacco auction season, which begins in April/May and continues through August/September, attracts traders, buyers, and day laborers from across the country. However, the sector faces persistent challenges, including limited input supply and volatile market conditions, which can negatively disrupt the tobacco value chain. Malawi's food security is highly susceptible to extreme weather events, which frequently disrupt agricultural production. Periodic droughts and floods have destroyed crops, leading to reductions in food availability and income-earning opportunities. Severe droughts linked to El Niño in 2015, 2016, and the 2023/24 season, along with flooding from Tropical Cyclones Ana and Gombe (2021/22), Freddy (2023), Chido (2024), and Jude (March 2025), caused major reductions in maize and other food crops production, particularly in the southern part of the country where the cyclones hit. High rates of poverty in rural areas and unemployment in towns and cities limit households' ability to buy enough food, earn income, and access agricultural inputs. The country’s broader economic instability often leads to sharp price increases, resulting in above-average costs for locally produced and imported food, essential non-food items, fertilizer, and fuel. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Malawi Food Security Outlook: February 2026 to September 2026 Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Malawi: April 2026 to September 2026 Latest Malawi Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 The 2026 maize harvest for some parts of the Middle Shire, Lower Shire, and Southern Lakeshore livelihood zones is below the five-year average. Below-average rainfall and dry spells during the maize flowering stage (mid-January to mid-February) led to moisture stress and reduced yields in these areas (Figure 1). In addition, intense rainfall in mid-March triggered flash floods in several central and southern districts, causing localized crop damage and further lowering production in affected areas. The flooding was also accompanied by washaways, waterlogging, soil erosion, and siltation, which damaged cropland, and adversely affected crop performance in some localized areas. Foreign exchange reserves remain below average, with foreign exchange availability still scarce amid high import demand and low export earnings. Businesses continue to face import challenges due to the limited availability of foreign currency at formal financial institutions. According to the World Bank, the current parallel market premium is around 140 percent above the official MWK/USD exchange rate. These foreign exchange shortages and high premiums are constraining the importation of essential commodities, including fuel, medicines, and key production inputs. Source: FEWS NET/USGS Annual headline inflation remains elevated at around 23 percent as of May 2026, driven primarily by persistently high non-food inflation. Income from crop sales is below average in some parts of the southern region, including the Middle Shire and Lower Shire livelihood zones, and central and southern lakeshore districts of Salima, Nkhota-kota, and Mangochi, driven by below-average crop production. Fuel prices remain significantly above average, largely driven by increases in international oil prices and high transportation costs. Although the Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority (MERA) implemented a 9.5 percent reduction in gasoline and a 5.7 percent drop in diesel in June 2026, this adjustment has provided only limited relief given the magnitude of earlier increases. Maize grain prices are currently above the five-year average, although they have experienced typical seasonal declines following the main harvest. At Mitundu, the national reference market monitored by FEWS NET, prices remain approximately 40 percent higher than the five-year average, despite a 20 percent decline observed between April and May 2026. Increased market reliance, particularly among very poor families, are above average in Neno, Mwanza, parts of Blantyre, Chikwawa, Nsanje, Phalombe, and certain areas of Mangochi, Mulanje, and Thyolo, following a period of below-average staple crop production. Consequently, there is an atypically high dependence on the market for cereals. According to data from the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) household survey, 20 to 40 percent of households in these regions are relying on markets for cereals and tubers immediately post-harvest (unseasonally early). Non-agricultural labor income, especially from construction-related work, is below average, particularly in urban and southern areas, driven by a slowdown in construction activity. Tobacco prices have remained lower than both last year and the average for the past three years, according to the Tobacco Commission. Prices are approximately 15 percent lower than the same period last year, standing at around 2.07 USD/kilogram (kg), down from 2.45 USD/kg. These prices are approximately 20 percent below the five-year average. Humanitarian food assistance Currently, there is no humanitarian assistance program being implemented in the districts. The lean season humanitarian food assistance delivered by the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA), in partnership with WFP, concluded in March after distributions were completed in several southern and central districts. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Southern areas Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are prevailing in Mwanza, Neno, Chikwawa, Nsanje, and parts of Mangochi district. Poor households have minimally adequate food consumption from own‑produced 2026 harvests and are supplementing with market purchases. However, poor households face below-average purchasing power as income-earning opportunities remain below average during the post-harvest period, and below-average crop production resulted in reduced income from crop sales. As a result, most households have constrained purchasing power and are unable to afford necessary non‑food expenditures. Most households are meeting their basic food needs through consumption of staple foods, primarily consisting of maize and vegetables. Central and northern areas Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes continue in Salima and Nkhota-kota districts in the central region. Households are mostly relying on own-produced food stocks despite below-average maize production, supplemented by market purchases, minimally meeting their basic food, but not non-food needs, due to reduced purchasing power. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes continue in the remaining maize surplus- and tobacco‑producing districts of the central region and the northern region. Households in these areas are meeting their food and non-food needs, supported by access to own‑produced food stocks and typical to above‑average income from crop sales, agricultural labor, and self‑employment activities. Additionally, households’ purchasing power has improved due to increased income from sales of horticultural crops such as onions, tomatoes, green leafy and other vegetables. Urban areas Urban areas are currently facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, with poor households able to meet minimum food needs but facing difficulties in covering essential non-food expenditures such as education, health, and housing. Persistently high costs of living — including elevated housing, transportation, and utility expenses and below-average incomes from both domestic and construction labor activities — continue to erode households’ purchasing power and constrain access to basic services. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Forecasts from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) indicate strengthening of El Niño conditions through at least January 2027. This is expected to result in a below-average start to the October 2026 rainy season, especially in southern areas. A strong event will likely lead to below-average rainfall and prolonged dry spells, particularly in structurally deficit-producing southern areas. Area planted for maize in southern regions is expected to be below average due to anticipated El Niño conditions, including delayed and below-average rainfall. An increased number of middle and better-off households are likely to reduce their farming activities. Foreign exchange shortages are expected to persist through at least January 2027, driven by structurally low export earnings, high import demand, and limited foreign reserves. Parallel market exchange rate premiums are expected to remain elevated, exceeding 100 percent of the official rate. Annual headline inflation is expected to remain elevated through January 2027. The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) projects 22 percent headline inflation for 2026. Although month-to-month volatility may moderate between June and September, inflation will likely remain above the five-year average from October through January. Fuel shortages are anticipated between June 2026 and January 2027 due to foreign exchange constraints. With MERA’s reinstated Automatic Pricing Mechanism for fuel, domestic fuel prices will likely follow international price trends. Maize grain prices are expected to rise from June through September. However, they will remain about 15 percent below last year’s levels, supported by food stocks from the recent harvest. Despite this, prices will stay around 70 percent above the five-year average. Between October and January, as market reliance grows, prices will rise further, approaching last year’s levels and remaining about 65 percent above the five-year average (Figure 2). Source: FEWS NET Access to improved agricultural inputs will likely remain constrained, especially for poorer households, due to substantially above-average prices for improved seeds and fertilizer amid reduced purchasing power. As a result, most farmers are expected to rely on lower-quality recycled seed and open-pollinated varieties and to apply fertilizer at rates below recommended levels. Agricultural and non-agricultural labor opportunities will likely remain below average in parts of the south due to an anticipated reduction in cultivated areas. Below-average livestock body conditions are expected from October through January due to limited feed and water availability, especially in the southern region, where the 2026/27 rainfall season is likely to be delayed and below average. Income from tobacco sales in 2026 is anticipated to enhance the purchasing power of households in tobacco-producing regions. However, below-average tobacco prices and the poor quality of tobacco leaves compared to previous years at the auction floors are expected to decrease overall earnings. Humanitarian food assistance Government and other humanitarian actors typically implement a lean season humanitarian assistance program from November through at least January, based on identified needs and the estimated period of intervention. Based on historical trends, some deficit-producing districts (up to 20 percent of the population) in the south are expected to receive humanitarian assistance between December and January. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Southern areas Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in Mwanza, Neno, Chikwawa, Nsanje, and parts of Mangochi district from June through September. During this period, poor households in these areas are expected to continue accessing food through their own food stocks, enabling them to meet their minimum food consumption needs. However, below-average incomes and reduced purchasing power will constrain households' access to essential non-food needs. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Mwanza, Neno, Chikwawa, Nsanje, Balaka, Phalombe, Chiradzulu and parts of Mangochi districts from October 2026 through January 2027, driven by constrained household access to food and depletion of food stocks. As the lean season starts, below-average incomes from agricultural labor — due to El Niño–related reductions in cropping and associated employment opportunities — alongside weakened purchasing power are expected to limit households’ ability to meet food needs through market purchases. As a result, food consumption gaps are expected to emerge among very poor households. During this period, households will increasingly rely on consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing meal frequency and portion sizes and skipping meals, alongside livelihood coping strategies, including selling productive assets (e.g., farm tools, goats/chicken) to access food. FEWS NET’s June 2026 Household Economy Analysis (HEA) confirmed that very poor households in these districts are expected to face survival deficits (less than 20 percent) from October 2026 through January 2027. Deterioration in acute malnutrition is expected; however, global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates are expected to remain within Acceptable levels. Central and northern areas Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in Salima and Nkhota-kota districts, particularly in the southern and northern lakeshore livelihood zones, from June through September. During this period, very poor households are anticipated to maintain minimally adequate food consumption but will remain unable to meet essential non-food expenditures due to constrained purchasing power. Households are expected to continue relying on their own-produced food stocks despite below-average maize production and supplement them with market purchases. Access to non-food needs is expected to remain constrained due to slow livelihood recovery following consecutive years of flooding and dry spells. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in localized areas of Salima and Nkhota-kota districts from October 2026 through January 2027. As the lean season starts, households are expected to face increasing pressure due to the anticipated early depletion of food stocks and increased reliance on market purchases. This shift to market dependence is expected to coincide with seasonally rising, above-average food prices and below-average income-earning opportunities — particularly from agricultural labor — thereby further constraining households’ purchasing power. As a result, food access is expected to deteriorate, leading to food consumption gaps among very poor households. Very poor households will engage in both consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing meal frequency and portion sizes, and livelihood-based coping strategies, such as selling productive assets. FEWS NET’s June 2026 Household Economy Analysis (HEA) projects that very poor households across these districts will face survival deficits of less than 20 percent from October 2026 to January 2027. Seasonal deterioration in acute malnutrition is expected from October through January, consistent with lean season trends. However, GAM rates are expected to remain within an Acceptable range. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Kasungu and Ntchisi districts from October through January 2027, as households are anticipated to have minimally adequate food consumption but be unable to afford some essential non-food expenses due to reduced purchasing power driven by below-average incomes from wage labor and self-employment. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected until January 2027 in the remaining central and northern regions, including maize surplus and tobacco-producing districts. Households are expected to meet their essential food and non-food needs through their own food stocks and average purchasing power from livelihood activities such as agricultural labor, petty trade, and self-employment. Most households will be able to meet both their food and non-food requirements. Urban areas Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027, as poor households are anticipated to continue meeting their minimum food consumption needs but face increasing difficulty covering essential non-food expenditures. Elevated costs of living — including high prices for housing, transportation, and utilities — are expected to further erode household purchasing power and constrain access to non-food essentials. At the same time, reduced demand for casual labor is likely to intensify competition for limited income-earning opportunities among the urban poor. As a result, many households are expected to struggle to secure consistent employment and maintain sufficient income to meet their essential non-food needs. However, urban areas are likely to provide relatively better income-earning opportunities compared to rural areas, which helps improve the purchasing power of urban residents. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Livelihoods profilesFEWS NET Qualitative Typical sources of food and income by livelihood zone El Nino ForecastNOAAQualitative/Report Crop and livestock productionMinistry of AgricultureQuantitative and qualitative reportFood availability: Crop production levels impact local food availability HEA Survival and Livelihoods protection deficitsFEWS NET - September 2025 QuantitativeHousehold food access- Wealth groups and livelihood zones with food consumption gaps Food Consumption and livelihood copingMalawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC)QuantitativeHousehold food access and consumption Macro-economic situationThe World BankReportTrade deficit-Foreign reserves SGR and ADMARC stock levelsMinistry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water DevelopmentQuantitative/QuantitativeFood availability- Institutional stock levels Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. National Rainfall deficits associated with El Niño are more severe and prolonged than anticipated Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: El Niño conditions delay the onset of the rainy season, followed by prolonged dry spells and below-average cumulative rainfall that are more severe than anticipated. Crop establishment and development would be significantly affected across southern and central Malawi. Reduced agricultural labor demands would further weaken the purchasing power of poor households. Expectations of lower national maize production would likely push maize prices above projected levels. Earlier depletion of food stocks and increased market dependence would widen food consumption gaps and accelerate the use of negative coping strategies. As a result, a greater proportion of poor households would likely experience IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) outcomes than projected under the most likely scenario. More severe-than-anticipated El Niño-induced rainfall deficits and extended dry spells Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Associated with El Niño, rainfall deficits more severe than currently anticipated and prolonged dry spells during critical crop growth stages would lead to widespread moisture stress, crop failure, and significantly below-average harvests across southern Malawi. Agricultural labor opportunities would decline substantially, reducing income among poor households already facing limited livelihood options. Lower local food availability, combined with atypically high staple food prices, would constrain food access during the lean season. Poor households would increasingly rely on unsustainable coping strategies, including distress sales of livestock, increased charcoal production, and reductions in meal quantity and quality. Consequently, food insecurity outcomes would deteriorate beyond current projections, with additional households facing IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and the worst-affected households at risk of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) outcomes. Tropical cyclone or localized flooding following prolonged dry conditions Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Although El Niño is expected to increase the likelihood of below-average rainfall, isolated tropical cyclones or episodes of intense rainfall remain possible and could cause localized flooding, particularly in flood-prone districts of southern Malawi. Flooding would damage crops, displace households, destroy productive assets, and disrupt market access and transportation infrastructure. These impacts would compound existing production losses from rainfall deficits, reducing household food availability and income and constraining market access. Food consumption gaps would widen among affected households, increasing the number experiencing IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or worse outcomes. Annex 5: FEWS NET’s Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA) To inform the June 2026 to January 2027 Malawi Food Security Outlook (FSO), FEWS NET conducted a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA) to assess how access to food and cash income will be affected by ongoing and anticipated shocks. HEA OA is one of six direct food consumption outcome indicators in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table and is used in FEWS NET’s convergence-of-evidence approach. It is the only outcome indicator that provides evidence of future outcomes. FEWS NET considers two main factors to assess the reliability of HEA OA results as direct evidence of food consumption: Likely accuracy of the problem specifications, which is largely dependent on the availability of credible information to estimate or make inferences about key sources of food and income. Relevance of the baseline to current livelihoods, which is often – but not always – tied to the age of the baseline. FEWS NET assessed that the information available to develop problem specifications for the Lower Shire Livelihood zone in Chikwawa district, Malawi, was substantial. The reference year for the baseline of the Lower Shire livelihood zone in Chikwawa district is April 2023 - March 2024, and FEWS NET assesses the baseline's current relevance as high. Based on these factors, FEWS NET has high confidence that the results of the HEA OA accurately present the size of food consumption deficits experienced by the population group of analysis. Problem specifications: The table below provides a broad overview of the quantity and price problem specifications (PS) behind the HEA OA. A PS translates a shock into household-level food security consequences through quantitative assumptions about the quantities and prices of key food and cash income sources during the projection period relative to levels documented in the reference year. While the OA assigns a point estimate to each key food and cash income source (e.g., maize, wheat, rice), the annex summarizes these points estimates into broader categories (e.g., main staple grains) and provides approximate ranges for a high-level summary. Results: As shown in the PS table, two sets of OA results are presented. Annual results are presented in graphs with three bars. The first (left) bar shows the relative importance of different food and cash income sources in the reference year (a typical year). The second (middle) bar shows the sources of food and cash income available in the year of analysis, after incorporating the impact of shocks and household coping capacity. This is compared against two thresholds shown in the third bar: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. Seasonal results are presented in a graph with multiple bars showing month-by-month results for the consumption year. This is where FEWS NET derives results that inform projections of acute food insecurity outcomes over the eight-month FSO period. The Survival Threshold represents the costs of covering the minimum food needs (2,100 kilocalories per person per day) and other essential survival items (e.g., soap, salt, kerosene for cooking, water for consumption). The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represents the cost of the Survival Threshold plus the costs of maintaining livelihoods (e.g., commodities and services such as productive inputs, health, and education). HEA OA outcome indicator thresholds with associated IPC Phases Minimal (IPC Phase 1) Stressed (IPC Phase 2) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Emergency (IPC Phase 4) Famine (IPC Phase 5) No livelihood protection deficit Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80%Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; survival deficit <20%Survival deficit ≥20% but <50%Survival deficit ≥50% Population group: OA is typically conducted across three to four wealth groups which are the population group of analysis, i.e., Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Middle (M) and Better Off (BO) households. Description of scenario(s): FEWS NET conducted a countrywide OA for all 18 livelihood zones of Malawi. For illustrative purposes, FEWS NET selected the results of the MW05, Lower Shire Livelihood Zone in Chikwawa district, to be presented in this annex. As an input to the FSO analysis, FEWS NET conducted the OA based on the most likely scenario, and the PS and results for this scenario are summarized below. Problem specifications: Food or income sourceProblem specificationsJustification Quantity produced or collected Crop production, including all area-specific key parameters among main staple grains, pulses, legumes, tubers, vegetables, fruits, etc. Maize grain – 51 to 75% Other staple(sorghum) - 76 to 100% Tubers (sweet potatoes)– 76 to 100% Pulses (pigeon peas) - 150 to 175% Legumes (groundnuts) - 76 to 99% Other crops (vegetables) – 100% Maize, sorghum, and groundnut production were below average, mainly due to prolonged dry spells. In contrast, pigeon peas, which are more drought-tolerant, performed better than most other crops. Livestock and milk production, including all area-specific key parameters among camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc. Livestock herd sizes (cattle) - 76 to 99% Livestock herd sizes (goats) - 101 to 125% Milk production - 100% Cattle numbers declined slightly due to several consecutive years of low calving rates. However, goat numbers remained stable or increased, reflecting their greater resilience and tolerance to drought conditions. Other food and income sources including labor, petty trade, gifts/remittances, wild foods, fish, typical social safety nets, and other Agriculture labor cultivation - 76 to 99% Agriculture labor harvesting – 76 to 99% Self-employment – 100% Other (petty trade) – 100% Availability of agriculture labor for cultivation at the start of the 2026/27 season is expected to be reduced due to the upcoming El Niño which is expected to reduce cropped area for maize and other crops. Labor demand for harvesting was low following reduced crop production in the past season. Prices for items sold - income sources Crop production, including all area-specific key parameters among main staple grains, pulses, legumes, tubers, vegetables, fruits, etc. Main staple grains(maize)- 201 to 250% Tubers (sweet potatoes) – 126 to 150% Pulses (pigeon peas) - 126 to 150% Other crops(Groundnuts) - 201 to 250% Prices increased due to below average crop production, above average production costs, high demand as well as persistent inflationary pressure. Livestock and milk production, including all area-specific key parameters among camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc. Herd sizes (cattle) - 251 to 300% Herd sizes (goats) - 301 to 350% Milk production - 251 to 300% Livestock prices increased mainly due to inflationary pressure. Other food and income sources including labor, petty trade, gifts/remittances, wild foods, fish, and other Agriculture labor - 301 to 350% Non-agriculture labor - 151 to 175% Self-employment - 351 to 400% Other (petty trade) - 351 to 400% Wage rates and self-employment activity prices increased following inflationary pressure. Prices for items bought - food and basic non-food items Main staple grains and other staples (pulses, oils, etc.) Staple grains (maize) - 201 to 250% Maize grain prices are projected to increase based on anticipated high demand, low supply and effects of inflationary pressure. Livelihood protection items that are key parameters, including all area-specific key parameters among agriculture inputs, health, education, and more Inputs (fertilizer) - 176 to 200% Education and health - 176 to 200% Prices increased for agricultural inputs, education and health following the impacts of inflation and increased fuel prices. Inflation (changes in inflation compared to reference year)176 to 200%Inflation increased following high forex premiums on the parallel market, low agricultural production, fuel price increases, and monetary policy challenges. Results: Annual OA results Source: FEWS NET Seasonal OA results Source: FEWS NET mtesfasilassie… Thu, 07/09/2026 - 00:14 Download the report 5
Okumaya devam et
ilgili gelişmeler- Ortak aktörcanlı
Tazminat krizi ve suikast tehdidi Hürmüz müzakerelerini çıkmaza soktu
ABD ile İran arasında Hürmüz Boğazı'nın yeniden açılmasına yönelik müzakereler, Trump yönetiminin Tahran'dan savaş tazminatı talep etmesiyle kilitlendi. İran'ın da ABD'den tazminat istemesi üzerine Trump, "asıl İran'ın ödemesi gerektiğini" söyleyerek anlaşma umutlarını azalttı. ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Rubio, "oldukça sağlam" bir teklifin masada olduğunu belirtse de, Trump'ın çıkışı diplomatik süreci baltaladı. Petrol fiyatları ilk etapta düşüşe geçse de, gerilimin sürmesiyle yeniden yükseldi. Bu arada, şubat ayında ABD-İsrail ortak saldırısında İran'ın dini lideri Hamaney dahil üst düzey yetkililerin ölmesinin ardından Tahran'ın Trump'a yönelik suikast planı yaptığı ortaya çıktı. Trump, temmuzda Ankara'daki NATO zirvesi dönüşünde Gizli Servis'in talimatıyla uçağını gizlice değiştirdiğini doğruladı; bu olay, tehdidin ciddiyetini gözler önüne serdi. Uzmanlar, suikast girişimini "aşağılanmanın intikamı" olarak yorumluyor. Hürmüz Boğazı'ndaki ABD ablukası İran ekonomisine ayda 18 milyar dolar kaybettirirken, İranlı yetkililer durumu "savaştan beter" diye niteliyor. Uluslararası toplum, küresel petrol arzını tehdit eden krizde tarafların uzlaşmaya varamamasından endişeli.
552 olay13 Ağu - Ortak aktör
Serious dialogue with Russia is EU’s responsibility — Slovak PM
Rusya1 olay15 May - Ortak aktör
Slovak PM asks that Ukraine peace language be included in EU Council final statement
Ukrayna1 olay05 Haz - Ortak aktör
Anchorage Ruhu Çökerken Ankara Zirvesi Rusya ile Gerilimi Tırmandırdı
Rusya’nın, Ağustos 2025’te Alaska’da Putin-Trump görüşmesinden sonra yarattığı ‘Anchorage ruhu’ mitinin çöktüğü ortaya çıktı. Bir yıl boyunca Kremlin propagandasına malzeme olan bu söylem, Ukrayna konusunda ABD ile varıldığı iddia edilen anlaşmaların savaş alanındaki gerçekleri değiştirmediğini gösterdi. Ardından gelen diplomatik trafikte, Trump’ın Putin ve Zelenskiy ile telefon görüşmeleri ve NATO zirvesi öncesinde her iki tarafın da çözüme istekli olduğuna dair açıklamaları dikkat çekti. Ancak Ankara’da düzenlenen NATO zirvesi, ittifakın Rusya’ya yönelik ‘savaşçı’ dilini teyit etti. Moskova, zirveye hazırlık sürecindeki bazı ifadeleri ‘saldırgan’ olarak nitelendirirken, Ukrayna’daki çatışmaların şiddeti zirve öncesinde arttı. Zelenskiy, Avrupa’dan Patriot hava savunma sistemleri talebini yineledi. Kremlin ise NATO’nun çatışma ve askeri genişlemeye odaklanmayı sürdürdüğünü vurguladı. Zirvede Slovakya Başbakanı Fico gibi isimler diyalog yanlısı sinyaller verse de, Rusya’ya 70 milyar euroluk askeri yardım paketine katılmama kararı sınırlı kaldı. Trump’ın kişisel diplomasisi ve Erdoğan’ın arabulucu rolüne olan güveni, sahadaki gerilimi dindirmeye yetmedi. Böylece ‘Anchorage ruhu’ yerini Ankara’daki karşılıklı suçlamalara ve Ukrayna’daki sıcak çatışmanın sürgit doğasına bıraktı.
Rusya15 olay11 Tem - Ortak aktör
Fico AB'nin Ukrayna'ya Desteğini 'Son Ukraynalı Askere Kadar' Diyerek Eleştirdi
Slovakya Başbakanı Robert Fico, Pazar günü Avrupa Birliği'nin Ukrayna savaşındaki tutumundan duyduğu hayal kırıklığını dile getirdi. Fico, AB'nin savaşı 'son Ukraynalı askere ve son euroya kadar' sürdürmeyi desteklediğini iddia etti. Bu sözler, AB'nin Kiev'e yönelik askeri ve mali yardım politikasına doğrudan bir itiraz niteliği taşıyor. Fico'nun eleştirisi, savaş boyunca koşulsuz desteği sorgulayan az sayıdaki üye ülke liderinin yaklaşımını bir kez daha gündeme getirdi. Açıklama, birliğin ortak dış politika ve güvenlik stratejisi etrafındaki kırılganlığı hatırlatırken, Slovakya ile Brüksel arasında Ukrayna konusunda derin bir görüş ayrılığını ortaya koyuyor.
Ukrayna1 olay14 Haz - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
Dünya genelinde peş peşe depremler: Yıkım neye bağlı?
Kolombiya1 olay13 sa önce