Irak Başbakanı Sudani’den Michael Corleone Benzeri Siyasi Tasfiye Stratejisi

Iraq PM embraces his inner Michael Corleone — for the best of reasons

In the iconic final sequence of The Godfather, Michael Corleone eliminated his rivals one by one while his son was being baptized. The scene stands as one of cinema’s most compelling depictions of power and the consolidation of control, and how a new order is forged through the destruction of the old one. Fast-forward more than half a century, and Iraq appears to be witnessing its own Godfather moment. Since taking over as prime minister in May, Ali Al Zaidi has launched an unprecedented crackdown on figures across the political and administrative establishment, involving investigations into billions of dollars in allegedly mismanaged funds and reaching deep into the networks of officials, bureaucrats and political actors who have benefited from Iraq’s patronage system. Foreign powers have largely embraced this operation, which Iraqi leadership has named “Dawn.” U.S. officials and segments of the international community view it as a sign that Baghdad may finally be confronting the corruption that has undermined governance for two decades. China, one of Iraq’s largest economic partners, also has reasons to welcome greater institutional stability. Even former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, long associated with the political order that emerged after 2003, commended Zaidi's crackdown on “those who have squandered the Iraqi people's money.” Shiite politician Muqtada al-Sadr, too, declared his support for the “heroic reform campaign.” For Zaidi, this represents a major political victory. His supporters have cast the anti-corruption drive as the next great national battle, drawing parallels with Iraq’s campaign against ISIS. As Shibl al-Zaidi, head of the Khadamat Alliance, declared, “The war on corruption is no less important or dangerous than the fight against terrorism.” Defining corruption Since the U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003, Iraq’s political order has evolved into a complex patronage system fueled by billions of American reconstruction dollars. When politicians were appointed to ministerial positions, ministries often became extensions of political parties, filled with loyalists rather than technocrats. Those lower in the hierarchy frequently built their own patronage networks through which they demanded payments, awarded contracts to allies and created informal systems of extraction. “Corruption stems from payments for the law not to be enforced,” said Aboubakr Jamaï, a prominent analyst of corruption in Morocco based at the American College of the Mediterranean. In this sense, corruption subsidizes the erosion of the rule of law. In Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, forms of corruption include the lucrative practice of informal, extractive policies. Ordinary Iraqis have felt the consequences for years. Citizens have faced demands for bribes to complete basic administrative tasks, while security forces and armed groups have at times extracted payments at checkpoints. Meanwhile, billions allocated for reconstruction, infrastructure, and public services have disappeared into opaque networks. The most notorious example was the so-called “heist of the century,” or more derisively, the “Baghdad job.” Between 2021 and 2022, approximately 2.5 trillion Iraqi dinars (around $1.9 billion) were siphoned from Iraq’s tax authority through fraudulent withdrawals involving a consortium of companies and officials. The scandal exposed how deeply corruption had permeated state institutions. A decade of anger More than a decade ago, anti-government protests swept across the political heartland of Iraq’s dominant parties, including the capital Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Karbala and Hilla. Driven by frustration over corruption, electricity shortages, unemployment and poor public services, the protests challenged the assumption that Iraq’s Shia population would automatically support Shia political elites. Shared religious identity proved insufficient when citizens were facing 120-degree Fahrenheit heat without reliable electricity or basic services. For then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, these protests were a major embarrassment, particularly as ISIS boasted of delivering services such as reliable electricity in the sprawling Iraqi city of Mosul, an implicit rebuke to the Iraqi state. Abadi responded by launching a series of anti-corruption initiatives, including the creation of a high commission to combat corruption. Yet these measures were widely seen as cosmetic reforms, adding another layer of bureaucracy without addressing the endemic structural problems. Zaidi’s approach is markedly different. He appears willing to tackle the challenge of reforming a political system that’s based on rewarding Iraqi politicians with posts solely due to their ethnic and sectarian backgrounds. While Zaidi’s administration is targeting political competitors, it has also faced pressure from the “banker of Baghdad,” U.S. Special Envoy for Iraq Tom Barrack. Himself accused by the Biden administration of corruption-related issues, Barrack represents the type of American power broker who understands where financial influence lies. As the famed American bank robber Willie Sutton reportedly said when asked why he robbed banks: “Because that’s where the money is.” Or, as Iraqi journalist Jasim Al-Azzawi put it, “the master switch of [Iraq’s] political economy, controlled from lower Manhattan.” There is little doubt that international intelligence and financial monitoring played some role in exposing illicit financial networks. Meter-high stacks of U.S. currency are difficult to move without leaving traces. It is entirely possible that the U.S. Treasury mechanisms and financial tracking systems contributed to identifying suspicious transactions. The greater challenge for Zaidi is that corruption is built into the architecture of the state itself. As Ali Mamouri, a former adviser to the Iraqi Prime Minister, wrote in 2024, corruption in Iraq is not just a matter of a few dishonest individuals, but an institutionalized system embedded within political parties, state institutions, patronage networks and the distribution of public resources. Uprooting it requires revisiting the political bargain that has governed Iraq since 2003. Original sin? Iraq’s system resembles Lebanon’s sectarian quota arrangement. The model was designed to prevent renewed conflict by ensuring representation, but it has largely failed to produce effective governance. Kawa Hassan of the Stimson Center said this political system is the “root cause of corruption” in Iraq. “This system has institutionalized state capture and the systematic pillaging of public resources,” Hassan argued. “Since 2003, it has enabled political parties to treat state institutions as sources of patronage and enrichment.” Hassan worries that the current crackdown is targeting the symptoms of this corruption rather than addressing the cause. “It is still too early to judge whether the campaign will ultimately succeed. However, based on what we have seen, it has largely targeted second- and third-tier politicians, members of parliament, government officials, and two principal political groups: figures associated with the previous government of Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and members of the Azm party led by Muthanna al-Samarrai.” Even among those who are optimistic about the crackdown, the consensus is that Zaidi cannot stop with weeding out individual figures. He must decide whether this campaign is about protecting his own political territory or whether it represents a genuine attempt to dismantle the structures that allowed corruption to flourish. Ultimately, the question facing Iraq is whether Zaidi will become Michael Corleone, a leader who consolidates power by eliminating his rivals while leaving his allies untouched, or a leader willing to challenge the entire system, including those at the very top.